The Jungle By Upton Sinclair Essay Example

The Jungle By Upton Sinclair Essay The Jungle By Upton Sinclair The Jungle By Upton Sinclair The Jungle portrays the lower ranks of the industrial world as the scene of a naked struggle for survival. Where workers not only are forced to compete with each other but, if they falter, are hard pressed to keep starvation from their door and a roof over their heads. With unions weak and cheap labor plentiful, a social Darwinist state of the survival of the fittest exists. The real story revolves around the integration and eventual disintegration of Jurgis Rudkis and his family, Lithuanian immigrants who move to the Chicago stockyards in hopes of a better life. Unfortunately, their hopes quickly disintegrate; like thousands of other unskilled immigrants at the turn of the century, financial necessity forces them into virtual slave labor in order to survive. For Jurgis and his family, the slave master is the ruthless and greedy meat packing industry, whose leaders value their workers no more than the animals they slaughter. The Jungle shows the relation ship between the animals that were being slaughtered and the workers who were slaughtering them, from very early in the novel. It compares the workers to the animals who are penned up and killed every day in We will write a custom essay sample on The Jungle By Upton Sinclair specifically for you for only $16.38 $13.9/page Order now We will write a custom essay sample on The Jungle By Upton Sinclair specifically for you FOR ONLY $16.38 $13.9/page Hire Writer We will write a custom essay sample on The Jungle By Upton Sinclair specifically for you FOR ONLY $16.38 $13.9/page Hire Writer jurgis, jungle, family, each, pg, animals, work, own, out, workers, shows, life, hopes, even, came, 35, upon, stockyards, nothing, hogs, dreams, being, after, while, very, truly, town, survive, something, political, passage, packing, over, men, meaning, man

Morality and ethics Essays - Taxation In The United States

Morality and ethics Essays - Taxation In The United States (Word Count:585) Based on the fact that most people tend to cheat a bit when they see the marginal cost of doing something wrong just this once always seems low, it might seem hard to change the behavior of cheating in the case of IRS. Surprisingly, people tend to pay their taxes at much higher rates than they should. There are many factors that leads to high tax compliance. Just thinking about morality shrinks our fudge factor could make us more honest. Despite Morality training usually will result in no beneficial long-term effect, reminding people of morality and ethics just before being tempted could dramatically make a difference to reduce or even prevent the chances of cheating. IRS uses this technique to warn taxpayers to think about ethics and morality. Deterrence threats and civic norms can also effectively raise tax compliance. The government deter citizens into paying taxes usually by the threat of a nonymous ways such as audits, fines, and legal prosecution. The model of rational crime can be applied in the case of IRS as well. We often rationalize things very quickly to determine the cost and benefit before implementing an action. Since the cost of cheating in this case will result in negative self-image and will even lead to sentence to jail, the benefit of actually being honest and pay the actual amount of tax seems a lot better thus peopl e choose not to cheat. Social norms can also influence taxpayers by emphasizing the importance of voluntary compliance. By reminding taxpayers to be good citizens of the nation, we can improve taxpayers sense of civic duty and improve their morality. This technique is similar to the example in class of recalling the ten commandments before cheating. The rate of cheating falls to zero after they answer the question about the ten commandments regardless of their performance. Also, by providing data for the result of cheating could also lead to cheat reduction. Because one aspect of cheating is related to the surrounding environment. If one taxpayer sees other taxpayers cheat on their tax reports, chances are the rate of cheating will dramatically increase, because the marginal cost of cheating seems low when everyone around cheats and because everyone cheats, the taxpayer will not think about self-image and self-esteem. The IRS could further increase their taxpayers compliance by asking the taxpayers question in the beginning of the form like would you like to give ten dollars to the organization to fight for corruption?. By doing this will not violate the double signature policy and will actually help taxpayers to think more rational and reduce the rate of cheating. If people commit money toward something, a good chance that later on, they will continue acting in a more appropriate and honest behavior and thus lead to an increase in taxpayers compliance. Another way that IRS could increase taxpayers compliance can be done by improve government performance. If citizens cheat a lot on their tax reports, that might also indicate that the government is corrupted. Chinese government is an perfect example of how corrupted government can lead to taxpayers to cheat. Misuse of money and resources will lose peoples faith in the government. generally, citizens are more willingly to pay the correct taxes if th e government delivers good services and welfare in return. Studies suggest that a countrys government corruptness is linearly correlated with citizens rate of cheating. Overall, the key to reduce cheating is to always keep in mind that morality is what makes people succeed.

The affect of Advertisements in print news in both online and print Research Paper

The affect of Advertisements in print news in both online and print editions - Research Paper Example Such type of advertising is highly cheap and convenient for businesses as well. Advertisements are placed in newspapers and online mediums so that it can attract a lot of consumers and spread the advertising message amongst a wide customer base so that more popularity can be gained for the product or service being advertised (Graydon 2003). Organizations know that all potential customers do not use all the mediums through which the advertising message can be available to them. Therefore the advertisers place their ads in different types of print mediums to attract maximum amount of customer. Job tenders and job offers are usually placed in the newspapers so that the business class target market can view the ads and then apply accordingly. These types of ads may not prove to be successful online as senior professionals do not use the internet to a large extent as compared to the younger generation. There are a large number of people in developed countries that use the internet and have their accounts in the various social networking sites available. Organizations use the online print mediums so that they can advertise their product and focus on their target market easily and cheaply. Latest fashion related products can be advertised on the various social networking websites and a lot of local and international customers can be attracted by this medium. Such advertising in newspapers may attract low customers but through online print medium, high amount of customers may be attracted. The advertisements that are specifically targeted towards young generation can prove to be highly successful if the online medium is used as teenagers are highly associated with the internet and may view the ads at one place or the other in the cyber world. Online medium is an excellent place to advertise all the latest fashion related products and

TechWatt Value and Risk Management Case Study Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 3750 words

TechWatt Value and Risk Management - Case Study Example These are TechWatt's presently known five requirements. First, fulfil the perception of value in making such a move. Second, provide enough space for 15 people working in a laboratory and light manufacturing. Third, provide enough office space for 12 managers and administrative staff. Fourth, provide space (e.g., a conference room) to accommodate visiting customers and prospects. Two conference rooms are preferable so when visitors use one, TechWatt employees have the other as needed. Fifth, TechWatt has 5 million to make a headquarters. These pre-project objectives are an incomplete "preferred solution". It's an 'initial brief' with too little information to proceed to Strategic Briefing. TechWatt makes software-hardware products. Constructing a headquarters facility is new with many unknowns. TechWatt will rely strongly on its Architect to be the Lead Consultant (LC) responsible to apprise the company of occurring new developments at each step, and giving good advice. Using the LC's experience is the smart approach to manage and try to optimise value and minimise risk, and do a Strategic Briefing. TechWatt must more thoroughly define value. The Architect/LC is in the best position to help clearly and concisely define and communicate value priorities and measurable expectations. This joint-effort Study uses RIBA's Plan of Work to clearly define value. Using RIBA methods, the LC shall guide TechWatt's work to identify and develop requirements (value), as well as identify constraints possibly blocking development. This is 'Work Stage A' or the inception of the Headquarters Project (HQP). Stage A / Inception requires careful considerations, or appraisals of as many things as it is possible to see about the HQP. The output of the Inception/Appraisal is a Strategic Briefing which is 'Stage B'. The Strategic Briefing shall define measurable value for the HQP. To make these determinations TechWatt shall work in conjunction with the LC. For now, all parties are evaluating the initial brief. Needed: Strategic Briefing with clarity - RIBA Work Stages A and B TechWatt needs to clearly determine future goals and scope of the HQP. Between now and the future, there is a gap to bridge. Management perceives value of the HQP as a bridge across the gap. TechWatt management has a Business Case mindset to support the aim to make a new headquarters. Business factors must stay in focus. Emotions must not override them. TechWatt's executive management team and front-line management (hands-on software and hardware experts) are best suited to clarify ideas for a Strategic Briefing about headquarters. To successfully launch the HQP, management must clearly define but not be limited to: - expected value added to TechWatt by the new headquarters, - 'must have' resources (accommodations, capabilities, etc.) in the new headquarters, - 'nice to have' resources (but possible to live without), - people and machines to make headquarters run well into the future, - trade-offs - pros and cons to of creating headquarters or not (cost of "Doing nothing"), - actual costs (Quantity Surveyor with input of Production, Purchasing and Accounting), and - opportunity costs (money lost by not doing certain opportunities; brainstormed largely by

The Role of Culture in Conflict Resolution

The Role of Culture in Conflict Resolution CASE OF DAGBON IN GHANA The inter-relativity and connectivity of human endeavor has made conflict something unavoidable as it has come to eventually be part of the normal routine of human social interaction. Ethnic conflicts and civil wars continue to plague many African countries especially in the last two decades. There are growing concerns about the impacts of these conflicts on sub-regional and regional stability as well as security, with adverse implications on economic growth, environment and development. The impacts of these conflicts have been severest on the vulnerable groups such as the aged, women and children reversing many development efforts in conflict zones (John Kusimi; Julius Fobil; Raymond Atuguba; Isabella Erawoc; Franklin Oduro Abstract: Conflicts in Northern Ghana a Mirror of Answers to Sub-Regional Stability and Security Questions). Conflict has both a colloquial meaning and a discouragingly long list of specific definitions. The list includes four rather different usages if the term: (1) antecedent conditions to some overt struggle (2) affective states (tension or hostility) (3) cognitive states (for example the perception that some other person or entity acts against ones interest and (4) conflictful behavior, verbal or non verbal ranging from passive resistance to active aggression. According to Wiktionary, conflict is an incompatibility of two things that cannot be simultaneously fulfilled. In simple terms conflict denotes a situation when two or more organizations or persons are in a contradiction between them.. Conflict is more expansive than normally perceived. The conflict is a contradiction, a war, maybe a competition exist but the real conflict condition is more greatest way to express violence, and where this take place and violence take effect, it generate more and more conflicts. Culture (from the Latin cultura stemming from colere, meaning â€Å"to cultivate†) is a term that has different meanings. For example, in 1952, Alfred Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn compiled a list of 164 definitions of â€Å"culture† in Culture: a Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions. However, the word â€Å"culture† is most commonly used in three basic senses: Excellence of taste in the fine arts and humanities, also known as high culture An integrated pattern of human knowledge, belief, and behavior that depends upon the capacity for symbolic thought and social learning The set of shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices that characterizes an institution, organization or group (Harper, Douglas (2001). Online Etymology Dictionary and Kroeber, A. L. and C. Kluckhohn, (1952). Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions) When the concept first emerged in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe, it connoted a process of cultivation or improvement, as in agriculture or horticulture. In the nineteenth century, it came to refer first to the betterment or refinement of the individual, especially through education, and then to the fulfillment of national aspirations or ideals. In the mid-nineteenth century, some scientists used the term â€Å"culture† to refer to a universal human capacity (C. Kluckhohn, (1952). Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions) Although largely ignored as being a key element in the generation of conflicts, culture is an essential part of conflict and conflict resolution (LeBaron, Michelle Conflict and Culture: Research in Five Communities in British Columbia, Canada). Culture, mostly acting within the parameters of a toothless bulldog, it permeate all spheres of the normal daily occurrences and it does so in the least expected ways. It serves as collating avenue which sends us messages that shape our perceptions, attributions, judgments, and ideas of self and other. Cultures are powerful, they are often unconscious, influencing conflict and attempts to resolve conflict in imperceptible ways. For the single individual, cultures are a shifting, dynamic set of starting points that orient us in particular way and away from other directions. Each of us belongs to multiple cultures that give us messages about what is normal, appropriate, and expected. When others do not meet our expectations, it is often a cue that our cultural expectations are different and thought or projected as un-respected. We may mistake differences between others and us for evidence of bad faith or lack of common sense on the part of others, not realizing that common sense is not cultural. What is common to one group may seem strange, counter intuitive, or wrong to another. In the dividing circles of two groups, culture projects a huge sense of uniqueness; something most individuals would prefer to die for than to witness it degraded by the opposing group. Whether a conflict exists at all is a cultural question, and by way of mutual illustration and interconnection between culture and conflict; cultures are embedded in almost every conflict because conflicts arise in human relationships. Cultures affect the ways we name, frame, blame, and attempt to tame conflicts. On the contrary, when any of the above is diverted by one cultural group vis-à  -vis the other, conflicts are the emerging consequences. Most people especially in Africa and other parts of the globe take pride in engaging in activities with a cultural sense than advancing the course of the general good. Conflicts between teenagers and parents are shaped by generational culture, and conflicts between spouses or partners are influenced by gender culture. In organizations, conflicts arising from different disciplinary cultures escalate tensions between co-workers, creating strained or inaccurate communication and stressed relationships. Culture permeates conflict no matter wha t, sometimes pushing forth with intensity, other times quietly snaking along, hardly announcing its presence until surprised people nearly stumble on it. For this reason, this essay seeks to reconcile the role of culture in the Dagbon conflict in Northern Ghana and how these same two connections of conflicts are again intertwined for the purposes of conflict and conflict resolution. The challenge is that, given cultures important role in conflicts, it is given little thought and consideration as it mostly labeled in the unconscious circle of human behavior vis-à  -vis conflicts and some approaches cultural resolution to the management and resolution of the conflict compound this problem because they minimize cultural role and influences in the tensed situation. We will consider the Dagbon conflict in and try to fit it within this frame of neglect. This is because the Dagbon conflict although largely considered ethnic has a huge cultural dimension which goes largely unattended to. Culture is always a factor in conflict, whether it plays a central role or influences it subtly and gently. Geographically and historically, Ghana lies between latitudes 50 and 110N and longitudes 10 and 30E with a landmass of 23.9million hectares. Ghanas estimated total population is 19.5 million (GSS, 2002:1), comprising a vast mosaic of several ethnic groups speaking over hundred local languages. Northern Ghana on which this paper focuses is co-terminus with a vast acreage of land that spans the White Volta, Black Volta and Oti River Basins. The area is divided into three political/ administrative regions comprising the Upper West (18,476km2) and the Upper East(8,842km2) regions bordering Burkina Faso in the extreme northern limits of Ghana and the Northern Region (70,384km2) to the south of Upper East and Upper West. Populations in these areas witness deep poverty levels and low literacy rates, with low school enrolment rate and inadequate health care services. Over 90 percent of the population in this area is engaged in subsistence agriculture and animal rearing (GSS, (2002). Populati on and Housing Census 2000: Summary of Final Results). Therefore, land ownership determines to a large extent, the nature of social and power relations among the ethnic groups inhabiting these three regions and has also been a major source of conflicts among them. The three regions harbor inconceivable heterogeneous groups of people speaking over 30 local dialects. The hidden truth is that, most of these heterogeneous groups have historical connections dating back to the sixteenth century. The sociocultural organization of most of these peoples of the northern belt is patrilineal with a strong tradition of centralized administration under the lordship of a powerful king such as the Mossi-Dagbani Kingdoms. In recent national political discussions, the Mossi-Dagbani groups are referred to as the ‘major tribes in Northern Ghana. However, there are also stateless or acephalous groups such as the Konkomba and the Tallensi. Therefore politically and administratively, there are a lot of historical and present day commonalities. This is what causes and infact possesses the bane of shock when it comes to the issue of conflicts and the most effective tools in dealing or handling them. The past 25years have witnessed a number of destructive ethnic conflicts in Northern Ghana. The very explosive ones are those of 1980 (Konkombas against Nanumbas) and the Guinea Fowl War of 1994 (between the Konkombas on one hand and Nanumbas, Dagombas and Gonjas on the other hand) (Brukum J. N. K, The Pito, Mango and Guinea Fowl Wars: Episodes in the History of Northern Ghana, 1980-1999). In 1980/86 and 2000, Mamprusis and Kusasis went to war in Bawku. Dagombas also fought among themselves; these and more are the most recent (and of which this essay critical look) of these intra-Dagbon clashes were those between the Andani and the Abudu Gates in Yendi, in 2002 (Brukum J. N. K, The Pito, Mango and Guinea Fowl Wars: Episodes in the History of Northern Ghana, 1980-1999). There has been much similar communal violence among the Gonjas and other ethnic groups in the Northern Region of Ghana. A critical assessment of the causes of most of these conflicts can be traced to colonial and post-colonial actions of governments. This certainly is no news as the impedes of colonialism is still being felt in Africa today. Certain actions and in-actions of governments have led to the marginalization, deprivation, exploitation and the exclusion of the ‘minority groups in many decision-making processes and governance issues that affect them. This has led to dissatisfaction among the ‘minority, hence any little dispute between the ‘majority and ‘minority explodes into ethnic conflict. With these analysis deduced, let us now try to envisage how the presence of culture among the people in the northern hemisphere of Ghana is contributing to conflicts among the people using the silent pistol. Culture, as already noted, forms the core around which most individuals normalize their relations with others but this relationship does take a different dimension when one gets the slightest hint of foul play in the unique identification of the other individual. This however differs from ethnocentrism, where people openly act and portray the supposedly uniqueness of their traditional origin and heritage over that of others and to some extent cause others to follow their fray. It is important to state unequivocally that culture has a canny way of taking on the characteristics of ethnocentrism but however does with a gradual pace. Due to the heritagecal and ancestral dimension of culture, conflicts resulting from culture and cultural practices do occur undetected for a very long time. Conflict of this nature sometimes begin from a mere proclaim which is interpreted to downgrade or cast the other sides image into disrepute. At times it start with a poorly resolved dispute (in our case the Andani and the Abudu Gates in Yendi) which forces the youths of the opposing party to rise up in arms against their foes after several years of the poorly settled dispute, which obviously one party wasnt satisfied with. When this happens, all possible gates of negotiations are closed due to the lengthy or at times the generational nature it usually takes to emerge in full scale. Recent political events and expression also mean the relaxation in conflict in one side and subsequent uprising in other with political transitions. In other words, the envisioned premise is ignoring the cultural dimension of conflicts by most Ghanaian governments with the impression that Ghana is the most peaceful nation on earth. Similarly, the lay magistrate often without really solving the dispute to any sides satisfaction ended up taking sides. Culture, with the trait of a silent killer largely goes undetected due the stable political climate Ghana is reputed for but the critical thing that most conflict analysts fail to take into consideration is that conflicts of this nature are intra-tribal rather than taking on the general good or in the form of civil wars, which has stalled the core of most African countrys government setup and social development. In exact terms, a cursory look at all historical conflict on the African region reveals tremendous ethnic and religious inclinations, albeit many of them also have subtle causal relationship with land and resource use, which could be a core of protest of one group against the other. The concept of nationhood/statehood is misplaced in many African nation state building contexts. Nations on the African continent, unconsciously motivated by the great diversity of ethnic groups, continue to trivialize national homogeneity and ethnic unification thus allowing for powerful disaggregated ethnic formations. The inevitable tendency of this phenomenon is that, many national policies by governments tend to be ethnocentric and is some unconscious instances cultural, which create suspicion, rivalry, discontent, mistrust and enmity among different ethnic groups or even within the same group of people as is the case in northern Ghana, resulting in ethnic conflicts and civil wars in extreme cases. In the case under discussion, most analysts in conflict prevention turn to focus solely on the tribal or ethnic sentiments forgetting that there cultural influences even on professional judgments vis-à  -vis the heated situation and culture prevent people from giving accurate feedback. Causes of conflict in northern Ghana. The Dagbon chieftaincy dispute is a good example of the passions that chieftaincy issues can inflame in Ghana, and of the extent to which these matters have become politicised. In the Dagbon case, a traditional matter has become the main subject of local politics as well as an issue of national politics. The Dagomba people or Dagbamba as they call themselves, constitute the single largest ethnic group in Northern Ghana. They speak the Dagbani language, a subgroup of the Mole-Dagbani family of languages, which belongs to the much larger Gur with starting the Dagbon migrations from Mali to what is now the Upper East Region of Ghana. Here he married Sihisabigu, the daughter of a Tindana in a place known as Bion, and eventually replaced the Tindana after assassinating him. Kpagunimbu and Sihisabigu had twin sons called Nyamzisheli and Nyarigili, who are believed to be the ancestors of the Talinsi and Nabdam ethnic groups of the Upper East Region. Following his exploits as a warrior, the King of Grumah, Abudu Rahamani married off his daughter, Suhuyini, to Kpagunimbu. Suhuyini gave birth to Gbewaa, two of whose sons Tohugu and Sitobu founded the Mamprugu and Dagbon kingdoms respectively. Sitobus son, Nyagsi, who reigned between 1416 and 1432, expanded the Dagbon kingdom through wars against aboriginal peoples throughout what is now present-day Dagbon. Thus the Dagbamba came to the area they now occupy as conquerors and established the traditional state of Dagbon, bringing with them the institution of chieftaincy, which had not been found among the original inhabitants. The Dagbon capital is Yendi where the King, whose title is Ya Na, resides. The Dagbamba are strongly attached to the institution of chieftaincy, which partly accounts for the intensity with which conflicts over chieftaincy are carried out. Conflicts tend to revolve around questions of succession, since the rules for succession tend to be rather flexible and allow for a number of candidates. Part of the current dispute (known variously as the Dagbon conflict or the Yendi chieftaincy affairs) hinges on whether or not it is a rule of tradition that succession to the throne should alternate between two rival sections of the royal family. These two sections originated in the late nineteenth century, following the death of Ya Na Yakubu who was succeeded first by his son Abudulai and then by another son Andani. Since the death of Andani in 1899, there has been in some measure an alternation between descendants of the two brothers, and the extent to which this rotation constitutes another rule for determining the succession remains unsettled. In addition to the question of rotation between the two families, there is also disagreement over who has the right to select a successor, and over which particular act in the installation ceremony makes one a Ya Na. Formally, the selection of a successor rested in the hands of four kingmakers. In 1948, the membership of the kingmakers was expanded to eleven with the addition of seven divisional chiefs to form a selection committee. The legitimacy of the Committee, which probably represented a final attempt by the British to codify the rules and procedures of succession to the Yendi skin, has been in dispute. In the 1940s, the educated elite of Dagbon most of whom were from its royal families played a major role in the setting up of the controversial selection committee. The institution of the selection committee coincided with the era of active pre-independence politics, and the pioneer-educated elite was poised to exploit the situation. Having a king who was more amenable to their political ambitions was of vital importance to them. By 1954, there were complaints that the committee system was adopted to protect the interest of the Abudulai family and ultimately eliminate the Andani family from the contest (Sibidow, 1970). One major source of conflict in modern times is the tradition that â€Å"you do not destool a Ya Na†. In former times, a Ya Na who proved unacceptable was simply killed. As this is no longer a practical alternative, once installed a Ya Na cannot be destooled even if he is found to have violated customs. Thus Dagbon custom as a whole is ambiguous on this point if not outright contradictory (Ladouceur, 1972). Such an implicit ambiguity facilitates the intervention of an outside power to settle outstanding disagreements as to the correct interpretation of tradition. It also serves not only to foment disputes but also to sustain them. Another source of the Dagbon conflict is intergenerational in nature. Intergenerational conflict arises because of the exclusion from succession of the senior sons of a king by his junior brothers. Conversely, the junior brothers in the older generation could find themselves excluded by the sons of their senior brother. According to Ferguson et al. (1970), the critical nature of exclusion is apparent. By virtue of the Dagbon rule that no son may assume a higher rank in society than his father, a candidates failure to attain office carries with it the implication that none of his descendants may ever aspire to it. Intergenerational conflict appears then to be a structural feature for succession to higher office in Dagbon. There is, however, probably a contingent association between such conflicts and the polarization between rival factions that is also a characteristic feature of the conflict. The candidates from the senior generation may tend to attract the support of the more conser vative factions and those from the junior generation, that of the more radical. The Dagbon conflict gradually spilled over into the national political arena over the years as each side mustered what forces it could with politicians taking an increasing interest in this and other chieftaincy disputes. Each side in the Dagbon dispute has articulate well-educated spokesmen and, since 1954, prominent national political figures as well. It was largely through their activities that the dispute became a political issue shortly after independence. On the Abudu side was Alhaji Yakubu Tali, Tolon Na, while the Andani side had J.H. Alhassan. Both men had become prominent figures in both Dagbon affairs and in the emerging modern political system in the early 1950s. Both were elected to the Gold Coast Legislative Assembly in 1951 and to Parliament in 1954, the former on the opposition regional NPP ticket and the latter to the governing CPP.11 If politicians can make use of their power base in the modern political system to interfere in traditional affairs, some traditional rulers are also quite capable of seizing opportunities presented by national politics to consolidate their own positions. Ya Na Abudulai III, sensing that he might be destooled, withdrew his support for the opposition and together with his followers, including Alhaji Yakubu Tali, joined the then ruling party, the CPP, en bloc in 1958. Political interference in the Dagbon conflict continued with changes in government. The overthrow of the Kwame Nkrumah government in 1966 marked radical changes in official ideology and priorities. In general terms, the policy of the National Liberation Council (NLC), the military regime, in traditional matters was to restore chieftaincy to its former position and reduce government interference. However, chieftaincy affairs took on an added importance in post-coup Ghana and government interference increased instead of dimi nishing. In the case of the Yendi dispute, government interference was taken to new heights when in September 1969, the selection and enskinment of Ya Na Andani III was declared null and void by the NLC government. It was felt that a factor in this decision that had objectively benefited the Abudulai family was the presence of B. A. Yakubu, a family supporter, in the NLC government. Thus the murder of Ya Na Yakubu Andani II in March 2002 took place during a time when the NPP government, successor to Prime Minister K. A. Busias party which succeeded the NLC, was in power was seen as significant. It succeeded in evoking memories of the killings in the Gbewaa palace in 1969. Zamfara state of the early Hausa kingdom. Drum history9, however, traces the origin of the Dagbon kingdom to ancient Mali whose king had been so impressed with the exploits of Toha-zhie, a wandering hunter, that he recruited him into his service. Toha-Zhie eventually married one of the daughters of the King of Mali called Paga-wobga, who bore him a son Kpagunimbu. Kpagunimbu is credited In trying to capture the role of culture in conflict especially in the Ghanaian context, it becomes imperative to trace the root cause of the conflict, taking a cue from the cultural dimension and gradually interpreting it in the resolution process. The idea is that, conflict no matter the ferocity, scholarship must seek to stop it occurrence owing to it unenviable consequence on the larger populace. Thus there are two principal lines being the prime movers behind the culture-led conflicts among the northern hemisphere of Ghana. The first of such, which has been partially discussed on the geographical notations in starting this conflict, is without doubt actions of earliest colonial governments. Many ethnic groups in Northern Ghana hitherto the introduction of indirect rule in Ghana in 1932 peacefully co-existed. The indirect rule system of administration introduced in 1932 by the colonial governors (Britain) vested political and administrative powers in the hands of some selected chiefs who had better organized systems of traditional administration (the chiefly people, i.e. Dagomba, Nanumba, Gonja etc.). For instance, the Ya-Na of East-Dagbon was given traditional cum administrative authority over the Konkomba and Chokosi who is quite culturally different ethnic from the Dagomba. The north-eastern Province (present day Upper East) was constituted into the Mamprugu Kingdom with f ive sub-divisions as Mamprugu, Kusasi, Frafra, Gurensi and Builsa all under the Lordship of the Nayiri as the paramount chief of Mamprusi. Similarly, the Nawuri, Nchumuru, Mo and Vagala were put under the Yagbonwurura of Gonja kingdom. This administrative initiative was implemented by Chief Commissioner Armitage. This was done for political and administrative expediency because the colonial administration at the time did not have sufficient logistics and personnel to govern the entire colony, especially the protected territories in Northern Ghana. Subsequently, there was the introduction of local police called â€Å"Nana Kana†, who constituted tribunals and for the collection of taxes and tried general cases except criminal ones. This enhanced the loyalty of the stateless ethnic groups to the paramount chiefs. The creation of the National Territorial Council (NTC) in 1938 for chiefs further increased the administrative authority of these chiefs. According to colonial writers such as Blair, Rattray, Tait, Cardinalland Manoukian, although the colonial administration imposed chiefs for administrative purposes, the acephalous people never accepted them, thus, they were never ‘ruled by the chiefly peoples, but were only raided periodically. The chiefly groups extorted monies from the stateless groups as fines, especially through the chiefly court system. The implication of these developments are that, with time emotional sentiments and passions are brought to bear with general official arrangements which gradually leads one side to call for changes. If the call is not heeded by the authorities involved, one side feels cheated and with the lapse of time lead to ethnic based but largely culture oriented conflict. According to Tait, Dagomba ‘rule was limited to sporadic raids to obtain slaves needed for the annual tribute to the Ashanti. From time to time, local tax collectors were sent to Konkomba territory to collect foodstuff such as millet, sorghum, yam, and maize, which was sold in the markets to raise money for the local chief. In 1950, some Konkombas were stopped by Dagombas on their way to Yendi market and their head-loads of new yam taken (which was valued at  £18), and in the same year when the Ya Na was fined in the District Commissioners court, two lorry loads of sorghum were collected in Saboba region alone on the grounds that, ‘The European says that it has got to be paid. Also according to Skalnik (1983 in Katanga,1994, pp21), Konkomba marriage disputes accounted for a large source of income for the court of the Bimbilla-Naa. Thus it became very rare for a Konkomba to appeal to the District Commissioner on cases of injustices, though instances of this sort of extor tion were frequent. Similarly, the lay magistrate often without really solving the dispute to any sides satisfaction took bribes from both parties. The cumulative effect of this was total allegiance of these non-chiefly tribes to the chiefly groups. The Konkombas for instance were compelled to give some days as free labor annually in the farms of Nanumba/Dagombas chiefs and the compulsory donation of a hind leg of any big animal killed wild or domesticated to Nanumba chiefs. Probably the most unfair of these injustices was that, Konkombas were not allowed to settle even petty quarrels among themselves including matrimonial ones, even as late as the 20th century. These conditions compelled Konkombas to request for their own tribunal under Ali, an ex-soldier, domiciled in Bimbilla, to settle petty disputes particularly marriage cases. This proposal was vehemently rejected and attempts were made to eject Ali from Bimbilla, culminating into a heated atmosphere (Brukum, 1999:11-12). Another crucial notation is post colonial government arrangements both internal and external in Ghanas northern region. Several uncharacteristic and unscrupulous actions of post-colonial governments saw a further deterioration in the social friction between the chiefly and non-chiefly ethnic groups which were largely operated by land administration policies. All lands in Northern Ghana were protected and were under the custody ownership of the Tendaanas (Earth-shrine Priest) and not chiefs. The chief (Na or Ubor) in the north wielded only political power. The Tendaana was the highest office held by the autochthonous tribes, and consisted legitimate ownership of the land which even extended over chiefs. The Na/Ubor never dared to arrogate to himself, the duties of the Tendaana. Infact, the Na/Ubor humbled himself before him and appeared disguised as poor when occasions arose for him to visit the Tendaana. This is because the Tendaana not only owned the land, but he is the only person known to the spirit of the land. Hence it was the Tendaana that had the right to give out lands. It was believed that, the Chief did not grant farming lands to individuals. He is considered not to have any right over farms. Tindaamba (another name for Tendaana) still have power over chiefs and are feared. During this era, land was not a scarce resource and according to Goody under such conditions neither individuals nor kin groups bother to lay specific claims to large tracts of territory, since land is virtually a free good (Katanga, 1994:21). Land ownership in northern Ghana came under the custody of chiefs in 1978 during the Acheampong regime when a law was passed vesting all northern lands into the hands of selected ethnic groups chiefs (notice the connection of the emergence of the intra-ethnic conflict between the Abudu and Andani Gates which will take several years to assume full scale) and left out most other groups. The criteria for vesting the lands in the hands of these few chiefs were based on the recommendations of Alhassan Report of 1978, which were backed by the Minister for Lands and Mineral Resources, both Dagombas (another watchful area, dealing with cultures involvement in conflict). Indeed the Alhassan Committees Report twisted the truth about the land tenure arrangements in Northern Ghana in favor of the chiefs and his tribesmen and the other chiefly people. These reforms in Northern Ghana Land administration were implemented by the then Government to solicit for political support from the Northern Chie fs for the UNIGOV System (Unity Government). With the failure of the Acheampong government however, these legislations were abrogated as the reins of government was overtaken by another military regime. The ceasure of the reins of government and the subsequent decree rule reversed this trend of land principles laid down by the previous administration and has ever since been the bane of confrontation between brothers in the different sides of the same group as is the case of the Dagbon conflict. The Konkomba Youth Association (KOYA) contested the Alhassan Report and has repeatedly pointed out that, the report has been the root cause of the three major ethnic conflicts and twenty minor ones between the chiefdoms. The jejune with these quack legislations is that they turn to outlive their significance with the transition of government, something that is purely not in the interest of the rural Ghanaian. There is no one-size-fits-all approach to conflict resolution, since culture is always a factor. Cultural fluency is therefore a core competency for those who intervene in conflicts or simply want to function more effectively in their own lives and situations. Cultural fluency involves recognizing and acting respectfully from the knowledge that communication, ways of naming, framing, and taming conflict, approaches to meaning-making, and identities and roles vary across cultures. In retrospect, culture as a key factor in conflict generation and orientation it that of a silent creeper. The kind that is in no way given premise by conflict analysts as being the prime cause in conflict situations. In the other words, the largel The Role of Culture in Conflict Resolution The Role of Culture in Conflict Resolution CASE OF DAGBON IN GHANA The inter-relativity and connectivity of human endeavor has made conflict something unavoidable as it has come to eventually be part of the normal routine of human social interaction. Ethnic conflicts and civil wars continue to plague many African countries especially in the last two decades. There are growing concerns about the impacts of these conflicts on sub-regional and regional stability as well as security, with adverse implications on economic growth, environment and development. The impacts of these conflicts have been severest on the vulnerable groups such as the aged, women and children reversing many development efforts in conflict zones (John Kusimi; Julius Fobil; Raymond Atuguba; Isabella Erawoc; Franklin Oduro Abstract: Conflicts in Northern Ghana a Mirror of Answers to Sub-Regional Stability and Security Questions). Conflict has both a colloquial meaning and a discouragingly long list of specific definitions. The list includes four rather different usages if the term: (1) antecedent conditions to some overt struggle (2) affective states (tension or hostility) (3) cognitive states (for example the perception that some other person or entity acts against ones interest and (4) conflictful behavior, verbal or non verbal ranging from passive resistance to active aggression. According to Wiktionary, conflict is an incompatibility of two things that cannot be simultaneously fulfilled. In simple terms conflict denotes a situation when two or more organizations or persons are in a contradiction between them.. Conflict is more expansive than normally perceived. The conflict is a contradiction, a war, maybe a competition exist but the real conflict condition is more greatest way to express violence, and where this take place and violence take effect, it generate more and more conflicts. Culture (from the Latin cultura stemming from colere, meaning â€Å"to cultivate†) is a term that has different meanings. For example, in 1952, Alfred Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn compiled a list of 164 definitions of â€Å"culture† in Culture: a Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions. However, the word â€Å"culture† is most commonly used in three basic senses: Excellence of taste in the fine arts and humanities, also known as high culture An integrated pattern of human knowledge, belief, and behavior that depends upon the capacity for symbolic thought and social learning The set of shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices that characterizes an institution, organization or group (Harper, Douglas (2001). Online Etymology Dictionary and Kroeber, A. L. and C. Kluckhohn, (1952). Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions) When the concept first emerged in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe, it connoted a process of cultivation or improvement, as in agriculture or horticulture. In the nineteenth century, it came to refer first to the betterment or refinement of the individual, especially through education, and then to the fulfillment of national aspirations or ideals. In the mid-nineteenth century, some scientists used the term â€Å"culture† to refer to a universal human capacity (C. Kluckhohn, (1952). Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions) Although largely ignored as being a key element in the generation of conflicts, culture is an essential part of conflict and conflict resolution (LeBaron, Michelle Conflict and Culture: Research in Five Communities in British Columbia, Canada). Culture, mostly acting within the parameters of a toothless bulldog, it permeate all spheres of the normal daily occurrences and it does so in the least expected ways. It serves as collating avenue which sends us messages that shape our perceptions, attributions, judgments, and ideas of self and other. Cultures are powerful, they are often unconscious, influencing conflict and attempts to resolve conflict in imperceptible ways. For the single individual, cultures are a shifting, dynamic set of starting points that orient us in particular way and away from other directions. Each of us belongs to multiple cultures that give us messages about what is normal, appropriate, and expected. When others do not meet our expectations, it is often a cue that our cultural expectations are different and thought or projected as un-respected. We may mistake differences between others and us for evidence of bad faith or lack of common sense on the part of others, not realizing that common sense is not cultural. What is common to one group may seem strange, counter intuitive, or wrong to another. In the dividing circles of two groups, culture projects a huge sense of uniqueness; something most individuals would prefer to die for than to witness it degraded by the opposing group. Whether a conflict exists at all is a cultural question, and by way of mutual illustration and interconnection between culture and conflict; cultures are embedded in almost every conflict because conflicts arise in human relationships. Cultures affect the ways we name, frame, blame, and attempt to tame conflicts. On the contrary, when any of the above is diverted by one cultural group vis-à  -vis the other, conflicts are the emerging consequences. Most people especially in Africa and other parts of the globe take pride in engaging in activities with a cultural sense than advancing the course of the general good. Conflicts between teenagers and parents are shaped by generational culture, and conflicts between spouses or partners are influenced by gender culture. In organizations, conflicts arising from different disciplinary cultures escalate tensions between co-workers, creating strained or inaccurate communication and stressed relationships. Culture permeates conflict no matter wha t, sometimes pushing forth with intensity, other times quietly snaking along, hardly announcing its presence until surprised people nearly stumble on it. For this reason, this essay seeks to reconcile the role of culture in the Dagbon conflict in Northern Ghana and how these same two connections of conflicts are again intertwined for the purposes of conflict and conflict resolution. The challenge is that, given cultures important role in conflicts, it is given little thought and consideration as it mostly labeled in the unconscious circle of human behavior vis-à  -vis conflicts and some approaches cultural resolution to the management and resolution of the conflict compound this problem because they minimize cultural role and influences in the tensed situation. We will consider the Dagbon conflict in and try to fit it within this frame of neglect. This is because the Dagbon conflict although largely considered ethnic has a huge cultural dimension which goes largely unattended to. Culture is always a factor in conflict, whether it plays a central role or influences it subtly and gently. Geographically and historically, Ghana lies between latitudes 50 and 110N and longitudes 10 and 30E with a landmass of 23.9million hectares. Ghanas estimated total population is 19.5 million (GSS, 2002:1), comprising a vast mosaic of several ethnic groups speaking over hundred local languages. Northern Ghana on which this paper focuses is co-terminus with a vast acreage of land that spans the White Volta, Black Volta and Oti River Basins. The area is divided into three political/ administrative regions comprising the Upper West (18,476km2) and the Upper East(8,842km2) regions bordering Burkina Faso in the extreme northern limits of Ghana and the Northern Region (70,384km2) to the south of Upper East and Upper West. Populations in these areas witness deep poverty levels and low literacy rates, with low school enrolment rate and inadequate health care services. Over 90 percent of the population in this area is engaged in subsistence agriculture and animal rearing (GSS, (2002). Populati on and Housing Census 2000: Summary of Final Results). Therefore, land ownership determines to a large extent, the nature of social and power relations among the ethnic groups inhabiting these three regions and has also been a major source of conflicts among them. The three regions harbor inconceivable heterogeneous groups of people speaking over 30 local dialects. The hidden truth is that, most of these heterogeneous groups have historical connections dating back to the sixteenth century. The sociocultural organization of most of these peoples of the northern belt is patrilineal with a strong tradition of centralized administration under the lordship of a powerful king such as the Mossi-Dagbani Kingdoms. In recent national political discussions, the Mossi-Dagbani groups are referred to as the ‘major tribes in Northern Ghana. However, there are also stateless or acephalous groups such as the Konkomba and the Tallensi. Therefore politically and administratively, there are a lot of historical and present day commonalities. This is what causes and infact possesses the bane of shock when it comes to the issue of conflicts and the most effective tools in dealing or handling them. The past 25years have witnessed a number of destructive ethnic conflicts in Northern Ghana. The very explosive ones are those of 1980 (Konkombas against Nanumbas) and the Guinea Fowl War of 1994 (between the Konkombas on one hand and Nanumbas, Dagombas and Gonjas on the other hand) (Brukum J. N. K, The Pito, Mango and Guinea Fowl Wars: Episodes in the History of Northern Ghana, 1980-1999). In 1980/86 and 2000, Mamprusis and Kusasis went to war in Bawku. Dagombas also fought among themselves; these and more are the most recent (and of which this essay critical look) of these intra-Dagbon clashes were those between the Andani and the Abudu Gates in Yendi, in 2002 (Brukum J. N. K, The Pito, Mango and Guinea Fowl Wars: Episodes in the History of Northern Ghana, 1980-1999). There has been much similar communal violence among the Gonjas and other ethnic groups in the Northern Region of Ghana. A critical assessment of the causes of most of these conflicts can be traced to colonial and post-colonial actions of governments. This certainly is no news as the impedes of colonialism is still being felt in Africa today. Certain actions and in-actions of governments have led to the marginalization, deprivation, exploitation and the exclusion of the ‘minority groups in many decision-making processes and governance issues that affect them. This has led to dissatisfaction among the ‘minority, hence any little dispute between the ‘majority and ‘minority explodes into ethnic conflict. With these analysis deduced, let us now try to envisage how the presence of culture among the people in the northern hemisphere of Ghana is contributing to conflicts among the people using the silent pistol. Culture, as already noted, forms the core around which most individuals normalize their relations with others but this relationship does take a different dimension when one gets the slightest hint of foul play in the unique identification of the other individual. This however differs from ethnocentrism, where people openly act and portray the supposedly uniqueness of their traditional origin and heritage over that of others and to some extent cause others to follow their fray. It is important to state unequivocally that culture has a canny way of taking on the characteristics of ethnocentrism but however does with a gradual pace. Due to the heritagecal and ancestral dimension of culture, conflicts resulting from culture and cultural practices do occur undetected for a very long time. Conflict of this nature sometimes begin from a mere proclaim which is interpreted to downgrade or cast the other sides image into disrepute. At times it start with a poorly resolved dispute (in our case the Andani and the Abudu Gates in Yendi) which forces the youths of the opposing party to rise up in arms against their foes after several years of the poorly settled dispute, which obviously one party wasnt satisfied with. When this happens, all possible gates of negotiations are closed due to the lengthy or at times the generational nature it usually takes to emerge in full scale. Recent political events and expression also mean the relaxation in conflict in one side and subsequent uprising in other with political transitions. In other words, the envisioned premise is ignoring the cultural dimension of conflicts by most Ghanaian governments with the impression that Ghana is the most peaceful nation on earth. Similarly, the lay magistrate often without really solving the dispute to any sides satisfaction ended up taking sides. Culture, with the trait of a silent killer largely goes undetected due the stable political climate Ghana is reputed for but the critical thing that most conflict analysts fail to take into consideration is that conflicts of this nature are intra-tribal rather than taking on the general good or in the form of civil wars, which has stalled the core of most African countrys government setup and social development. In exact terms, a cursory look at all historical conflict on the African region reveals tremendous ethnic and religious inclinations, albeit many of them also have subtle causal relationship with land and resource use, which could be a core of protest of one group against the other. The concept of nationhood/statehood is misplaced in many African nation state building contexts. Nations on the African continent, unconsciously motivated by the great diversity of ethnic groups, continue to trivialize national homogeneity and ethnic unification thus allowing for powerful disaggregated ethnic formations. The inevitable tendency of this phenomenon is that, many national policies by governments tend to be ethnocentric and is some unconscious instances cultural, which create suspicion, rivalry, discontent, mistrust and enmity among different ethnic groups or even within the same group of people as is the case in northern Ghana, resulting in ethnic conflicts and civil wars in extreme cases. In the case under discussion, most analysts in conflict prevention turn to focus solely on the tribal or ethnic sentiments forgetting that there cultural influences even on professional judgments vis-à  -vis the heated situation and culture prevent people from giving accurate feedback. Causes of conflict in northern Ghana. The Dagbon chieftaincy dispute is a good example of the passions that chieftaincy issues can inflame in Ghana, and of the extent to which these matters have become politicised. In the Dagbon case, a traditional matter has become the main subject of local politics as well as an issue of national politics. The Dagomba people or Dagbamba as they call themselves, constitute the single largest ethnic group in Northern Ghana. They speak the Dagbani language, a subgroup of the Mole-Dagbani family of languages, which belongs to the much larger Gur with starting the Dagbon migrations from Mali to what is now the Upper East Region of Ghana. Here he married Sihisabigu, the daughter of a Tindana in a place known as Bion, and eventually replaced the Tindana after assassinating him. Kpagunimbu and Sihisabigu had twin sons called Nyamzisheli and Nyarigili, who are believed to be the ancestors of the Talinsi and Nabdam ethnic groups of the Upper East Region. Following his exploits as a warrior, the King of Grumah, Abudu Rahamani married off his daughter, Suhuyini, to Kpagunimbu. Suhuyini gave birth to Gbewaa, two of whose sons Tohugu and Sitobu founded the Mamprugu and Dagbon kingdoms respectively. Sitobus son, Nyagsi, who reigned between 1416 and 1432, expanded the Dagbon kingdom through wars against aboriginal peoples throughout what is now present-day Dagbon. Thus the Dagbamba came to the area they now occupy as conquerors and established the traditional state of Dagbon, bringing with them the institution of chieftaincy, which had not been found among the original inhabitants. The Dagbon capital is Yendi where the King, whose title is Ya Na, resides. The Dagbamba are strongly attached to the institution of chieftaincy, which partly accounts for the intensity with which conflicts over chieftaincy are carried out. Conflicts tend to revolve around questions of succession, since the rules for succession tend to be rather flexible and allow for a number of candidates. Part of the current dispute (known variously as the Dagbon conflict or the Yendi chieftaincy affairs) hinges on whether or not it is a rule of tradition that succession to the throne should alternate between two rival sections of the royal family. These two sections originated in the late nineteenth century, following the death of Ya Na Yakubu who was succeeded first by his son Abudulai and then by another son Andani. Since the death of Andani in 1899, there has been in some measure an alternation between descendants of the two brothers, and the extent to which this rotation constitutes another rule for determining the succession remains unsettled. In addition to the question of rotation between the two families, there is also disagreement over who has the right to select a successor, and over which particular act in the installation ceremony makes one a Ya Na. Formally, the selection of a successor rested in the hands of four kingmakers. In 1948, the membership of the kingmakers was expanded to eleven with the addition of seven divisional chiefs to form a selection committee. The legitimacy of the Committee, which probably represented a final attempt by the British to codify the rules and procedures of succession to the Yendi skin, has been in dispute. In the 1940s, the educated elite of Dagbon most of whom were from its royal families played a major role in the setting up of the controversial selection committee. The institution of the selection committee coincided with the era of active pre-independence politics, and the pioneer-educated elite was poised to exploit the situation. Having a king who was more amenable to their political ambitions was of vital importance to them. By 1954, there were complaints that the committee system was adopted to protect the interest of the Abudulai family and ultimately eliminate the Andani family from the contest (Sibidow, 1970). One major source of conflict in modern times is the tradition that â€Å"you do not destool a Ya Na†. In former times, a Ya Na who proved unacceptable was simply killed. As this is no longer a practical alternative, once installed a Ya Na cannot be destooled even if he is found to have violated customs. Thus Dagbon custom as a whole is ambiguous on this point if not outright contradictory (Ladouceur, 1972). Such an implicit ambiguity facilitates the intervention of an outside power to settle outstanding disagreements as to the correct interpretation of tradition. It also serves not only to foment disputes but also to sustain them. Another source of the Dagbon conflict is intergenerational in nature. Intergenerational conflict arises because of the exclusion from succession of the senior sons of a king by his junior brothers. Conversely, the junior brothers in the older generation could find themselves excluded by the sons of their senior brother. According to Ferguson et al. (1970), the critical nature of exclusion is apparent. By virtue of the Dagbon rule that no son may assume a higher rank in society than his father, a candidates failure to attain office carries with it the implication that none of his descendants may ever aspire to it. Intergenerational conflict appears then to be a structural feature for succession to higher office in Dagbon. There is, however, probably a contingent association between such conflicts and the polarization between rival factions that is also a characteristic feature of the conflict. The candidates from the senior generation may tend to attract the support of the more conser vative factions and those from the junior generation, that of the more radical. The Dagbon conflict gradually spilled over into the national political arena over the years as each side mustered what forces it could with politicians taking an increasing interest in this and other chieftaincy disputes. Each side in the Dagbon dispute has articulate well-educated spokesmen and, since 1954, prominent national political figures as well. It was largely through their activities that the dispute became a political issue shortly after independence. On the Abudu side was Alhaji Yakubu Tali, Tolon Na, while the Andani side had J.H. Alhassan. Both men had become prominent figures in both Dagbon affairs and in the emerging modern political system in the early 1950s. Both were elected to the Gold Coast Legislative Assembly in 1951 and to Parliament in 1954, the former on the opposition regional NPP ticket and the latter to the governing CPP.11 If politicians can make use of their power base in the modern political system to interfere in traditional affairs, some traditional rulers are also quite capable of seizing opportunities presented by national politics to consolidate their own positions. Ya Na Abudulai III, sensing that he might be destooled, withdrew his support for the opposition and together with his followers, including Alhaji Yakubu Tali, joined the then ruling party, the CPP, en bloc in 1958. Political interference in the Dagbon conflict continued with changes in government. The overthrow of the Kwame Nkrumah government in 1966 marked radical changes in official ideology and priorities. In general terms, the policy of the National Liberation Council (NLC), the military regime, in traditional matters was to restore chieftaincy to its former position and reduce government interference. However, chieftaincy affairs took on an added importance in post-coup Ghana and government interference increased instead of dimi nishing. In the case of the Yendi dispute, government interference was taken to new heights when in September 1969, the selection and enskinment of Ya Na Andani III was declared null and void by the NLC government. It was felt that a factor in this decision that had objectively benefited the Abudulai family was the presence of B. A. Yakubu, a family supporter, in the NLC government. Thus the murder of Ya Na Yakubu Andani II in March 2002 took place during a time when the NPP government, successor to Prime Minister K. A. Busias party which succeeded the NLC, was in power was seen as significant. It succeeded in evoking memories of the killings in the Gbewaa palace in 1969. Zamfara state of the early Hausa kingdom. Drum history9, however, traces the origin of the Dagbon kingdom to ancient Mali whose king had been so impressed with the exploits of Toha-zhie, a wandering hunter, that he recruited him into his service. Toha-Zhie eventually married one of the daughters of the King of Mali called Paga-wobga, who bore him a son Kpagunimbu. Kpagunimbu is credited In trying to capture the role of culture in conflict especially in the Ghanaian context, it becomes imperative to trace the root cause of the conflict, taking a cue from the cultural dimension and gradually interpreting it in the resolution process. The idea is that, conflict no matter the ferocity, scholarship must seek to stop it occurrence owing to it unenviable consequence on the larger populace. Thus there are two principal lines being the prime movers behind the culture-led conflicts among the northern hemisphere of Ghana. The first of such, which has been partially discussed on the geographical notations in starting this conflict, is without doubt actions of earliest colonial governments. Many ethnic groups in Northern Ghana hitherto the introduction of indirect rule in Ghana in 1932 peacefully co-existed. The indirect rule system of administration introduced in 1932 by the colonial governors (Britain) vested political and administrative powers in the hands of some selected chiefs who had better organized systems of traditional administration (the chiefly people, i.e. Dagomba, Nanumba, Gonja etc.). For instance, the Ya-Na of East-Dagbon was given traditional cum administrative authority over the Konkomba and Chokosi who is quite culturally different ethnic from the Dagomba. The north-eastern Province (present day Upper East) was constituted into the Mamprugu Kingdom with f ive sub-divisions as Mamprugu, Kusasi, Frafra, Gurensi and Builsa all under the Lordship of the Nayiri as the paramount chief of Mamprusi. Similarly, the Nawuri, Nchumuru, Mo and Vagala were put under the Yagbonwurura of Gonja kingdom. This administrative initiative was implemented by Chief Commissioner Armitage. This was done for political and administrative expediency because the colonial administration at the time did not have sufficient logistics and personnel to govern the entire colony, especially the protected territories in Northern Ghana. Subsequently, there was the introduction of local police called â€Å"Nana Kana†, who constituted tribunals and for the collection of taxes and tried general cases except criminal ones. This enhanced the loyalty of the stateless ethnic groups to the paramount chiefs. The creation of the National Territorial Council (NTC) in 1938 for chiefs further increased the administrative authority of these chiefs. According to colonial writers such as Blair, Rattray, Tait, Cardinalland Manoukian, although the colonial administration imposed chiefs for administrative purposes, the acephalous people never accepted them, thus, they were never ‘ruled by the chiefly peoples, but were only raided periodically. The chiefly groups extorted monies from the stateless groups as fines, especially through the chiefly court system. The implication of these developments are that, with time emotional sentiments and passions are brought to bear with general official arrangements which gradually leads one side to call for changes. If the call is not heeded by the authorities involved, one side feels cheated and with the lapse of time lead to ethnic based but largely culture oriented conflict. According to Tait, Dagomba ‘rule was limited to sporadic raids to obtain slaves needed for the annual tribute to the Ashanti. From time to time, local tax collectors were sent to Konkomba territory to collect foodstuff such as millet, sorghum, yam, and maize, which was sold in the markets to raise money for the local chief. In 1950, some Konkombas were stopped by Dagombas on their way to Yendi market and their head-loads of new yam taken (which was valued at  £18), and in the same year when the Ya Na was fined in the District Commissioners court, two lorry loads of sorghum were collected in Saboba region alone on the grounds that, ‘The European says that it has got to be paid. Also according to Skalnik (1983 in Katanga,1994, pp21), Konkomba marriage disputes accounted for a large source of income for the court of the Bimbilla-Naa. Thus it became very rare for a Konkomba to appeal to the District Commissioner on cases of injustices, though instances of this sort of extor tion were frequent. Similarly, the lay magistrate often without really solving the dispute to any sides satisfaction took bribes from both parties. The cumulative effect of this was total allegiance of these non-chiefly tribes to the chiefly groups. The Konkombas for instance were compelled to give some days as free labor annually in the farms of Nanumba/Dagombas chiefs and the compulsory donation of a hind leg of any big animal killed wild or domesticated to Nanumba chiefs. Probably the most unfair of these injustices was that, Konkombas were not allowed to settle even petty quarrels among themselves including matrimonial ones, even as late as the 20th century. These conditions compelled Konkombas to request for their own tribunal under Ali, an ex-soldier, domiciled in Bimbilla, to settle petty disputes particularly marriage cases. This proposal was vehemently rejected and attempts were made to eject Ali from Bimbilla, culminating into a heated atmosphere (Brukum, 1999:11-12). Another crucial notation is post colonial government arrangements both internal and external in Ghanas northern region. Several uncharacteristic and unscrupulous actions of post-colonial governments saw a further deterioration in the social friction between the chiefly and non-chiefly ethnic groups which were largely operated by land administration policies. All lands in Northern Ghana were protected and were under the custody ownership of the Tendaanas (Earth-shrine Priest) and not chiefs. The chief (Na or Ubor) in the north wielded only political power. The Tendaana was the highest office held by the autochthonous tribes, and consisted legitimate ownership of the land which even extended over chiefs. The Na/Ubor never dared to arrogate to himself, the duties of the Tendaana. Infact, the Na/Ubor humbled himself before him and appeared disguised as poor when occasions arose for him to visit the Tendaana. This is because the Tendaana not only owned the land, but he is the only person known to the spirit of the land. Hence it was the Tendaana that had the right to give out lands. It was believed that, the Chief did not grant farming lands to individuals. He is considered not to have any right over farms. Tindaamba (another name for Tendaana) still have power over chiefs and are feared. During this era, land was not a scarce resource and according to Goody under such conditions neither individuals nor kin groups bother to lay specific claims to large tracts of territory, since land is virtually a free good (Katanga, 1994:21). Land ownership in northern Ghana came under the custody of chiefs in 1978 during the Acheampong regime when a law was passed vesting all northern lands into the hands of selected ethnic groups chiefs (notice the connection of the emergence of the intra-ethnic conflict between the Abudu and Andani Gates which will take several years to assume full scale) and left out most other groups. The criteria for vesting the lands in the hands of these few chiefs were based on the recommendations of Alhassan Report of 1978, which were backed by the Minister for Lands and Mineral Resources, both Dagombas (another watchful area, dealing with cultures involvement in conflict). Indeed the Alhassan Committees Report twisted the truth about the land tenure arrangements in Northern Ghana in favor of the chiefs and his tribesmen and the other chiefly people. These reforms in Northern Ghana Land administration were implemented by the then Government to solicit for political support from the Northern Chie fs for the UNIGOV System (Unity Government). With the failure of the Acheampong government however, these legislations were abrogated as the reins of government was overtaken by another military regime. The ceasure of the reins of government and the subsequent decree rule reversed this trend of land principles laid down by the previous administration and has ever since been the bane of confrontation between brothers in the different sides of the same group as is the case of the Dagbon conflict. The Konkomba Youth Association (KOYA) contested the Alhassan Report and has repeatedly pointed out that, the report has been the root cause of the three major ethnic conflicts and twenty minor ones between the chiefdoms. The jejune with these quack legislations is that they turn to outlive their significance with the transition of government, something that is purely not in the interest of the rural Ghanaian. There is no one-size-fits-all approach to conflict resolution, since culture is always a factor. Cultural fluency is therefore a core competency for those who intervene in conflicts or simply want to function more effectively in their own lives and situations. Cultural fluency involves recognizing and acting respectfully from the knowledge that communication, ways of naming, framing, and taming conflict, approaches to meaning-making, and identities and roles vary across cultures. In retrospect, culture as a key factor in conflict generation and orientation it that of a silent creeper. The kind that is in no way given premise by conflict analysts as being the prime cause in conflict situations. In the other words, the largel

Evaluation of Differential Research Methods Essay

In this essay we will look at the positive and negative aspects of the group presentation of remit 1. We will also look into the different research methods we took on to gather relevant information that we needed. Then recommendations we want to include for improvement from our verbal feedback alongside with any constraining factors we, as a group encountered. The essay will then look into the use and analysis of theory that we used that assisted us in making our final campaign. Once our group was given the idea of the university application we began to group ideas together as to what will work most effectively. We chose to use the campaign idea of viral marketing. To do this we took on a semantic and semiotic approach, whereby used signified linguistics to identify what we wanted to communicate and how. Semantic is better defined as ‘the study of linguistic development by classifying and examining changes in meaning and form’ [Semantics 2, 1994] our campaign idea was developed around the concept of transferring different meanings, for example in our campaign we developed the idea from the message we wanted to transfer across, which was the ease of use of the application along with the ability to make the video viral. Taking a semantic approach can allow the user to interpret form and meaning for them, the implementation of the meaning is posed but is left entirely to the user to self-interpret. Our campaign did however briefly touch over on semantic advertising, as we aimed the campaign as an viral video aimed at the social networking side of things we implemented the thoughts of just how effective it can be to specific target audiences to advertise on particular mediums. Our campaign idea could of better utilised the semantic concepts by identifying key phrases or words and adapting those words to create alternate meanings. Many semantic campaigns today are internet based, with a high increase of internet cookie tracking data being used by companies to then forward on products to consumers with similar search data. We decided to stay away from this concept as it falls into the category of anonymity and as an academic foundation we felt it more reputable to remain known. Semiotics is better defined as ‘The study of signs and symbols and their use or interpretation’ [U, Eco, 1979] in our campaign we used many semiotic concepts and in fact it is arguably what our final idea was based around. In our storyboard campaign we decided to use the cartoon to real like to cartoon to real life effect which we used to indicate different scenarios, for example when the person first starts off he is a real life person standing with the application in his hand representing real life. The user then enters the University College Birmingham application whereby he is taken into another dimension and we see the use of different symbols and signs to recreate a fictional dimension. The use of this was to indicate exciting ways to being able to receive the information you need. In the cartoon storyboards the use of colours that we used were primary colours, which were used to indicate simplicity while portraying the ability to enjoy the application. It is also important to mention the signified and signifier model which we briefly used in the construction of our campaign, using key word associations it quickly gave us access to relevant wording which tied in with the possible campaign ideas. Finally to talk about the last concept that was used in the campaign we chose is rhetoric, better defined as ‘Language designed to have a persuasive or impressive effect on its audience’ [G,Tom & Eves, A 1999] in our campaign we opted for the viral video, in hope that this would tap into our target market which were young students. In the campaign with the concepts we used by interacting on social networking sites we intending to create a persuasive advertising campaign that attempted to eliminate any preconceived ideas that university information was complicated and hard to get a hold of. The use of language we used in the campaign was simplistic while informative; we left no vital pieces of information out of the campaign while also making the thought of this information entertaining. The overall effect we intended to make on our target audience was to leave a lasting impressive imprint that the viral video we had created was informative, fun and appealing to our audience. In a highly competitive market it is essential for students to understand exactly what they seek and for it to be easily accessible, by creating the viral campaign with the use of social networking sites it allows the audience to access the information they need directly or through friends. To conclude, with the campaign we ran with and the concepts we took on board to get to the final decision we used a variety of different models, in particular the semiotic model whereby we used a variety of different colours, forms and meanings to portray different emotions to the user to engage them. We then took on board some semantic concepts by allowing the campaign to become a viral video and publishing this online it acted not only as a source of information but in turn an advertisement of the application and university. To recommend what could have changed with the campaign final idea or what could have been done instead to better our chances of the campaign idea being successful there would be a few recommendations. The implication further of semantic concepts could have been implemented in to the campaign idea of using social networking. The application draft idea picked up little criticism other than the presentation of the application and its data. If the project was to be undertaken again the use of rhetoric alongside semantic would be heavily prevalent to tap into the internet advertising market alongside the use of websites which creating platforms to share videos, blogs and articles.

Political Parties and Unfair Elections Essay

This party system was the first ‘truly national system’, consisting of the Democrats (followers of Jackson) and Whigs (opponents of Jackson) fairly balanced in most regions (Wilson and DiIulio, Jr. 196). The Civil War split the political parties in several ways. There was a deep difference in opinion between the parties over the issue of slavery and sectionalism. Both parties tried to ‘straddle the issues’ to avoid dividing their followers and losing the election to their rival (Wilson and DiIulio, Jr. 196). But the old parties divided and new ones emerged. As a result of the Civil War the modern Republican Party began as a third party. The Republican Party’s strength lay in the North; Abraham Lincoln did not receive a single electoral vote from a Southern state in 1860. The Democrats in the North divided into War Democrats, who supported the war effort but claimed the Republicans were doing a poor job of leading the Union, and the Peace Democrats, or Copperheads, who opposed the war and were suspected of disloyalty to the Union. To win the election of 1864, the Republicans reorganized themselves as the Union party to attract votes from the War Democrats and nominated War Democrat Andrew Johnson for vice president. When Lincoln was assassinated, Democrat Johnson became president. Following the Civil War, Republicans moved quickly to consolidate their control of the United States government. They quickly added a series of Western states to the Union, states that they expected would remain firm in their support for Republicans. The Republican Party’s pro-business positions played well in the industrial North and Midwest, while the Democrats held the â€Å"solid South. † The large number of immigrants who came to the United States, together with the growing industrial workforce, laid the basis for strong, largely Democratic political machines in New York, Chicago, and other large cities (CliffsNotes. com). So at this point there were basically two political parties, the Democrats and the Republicans. The Democrats dominated national politics for the next 20 years. Democratic dominance collapsed in the 1960s in response to the Vietnam War. There was unprecedented rioting against the principles of the war and Democrats blamed their party for the riots and the rise in unlawful behavior and protests. Due to that fact, support of the Democratic Party sharply declined. From the 1968 election of Richard Nixon to Bill Clinton’s 1992 victory, only one Democrat attained the White House: Jimmy Carter, whose term spanned 1976 to 1980. The Electoral College is a major factor in sustaining a majority two-party system, but does not necessarily keep elections fair. If the popular vote in a state is very close, the winner gets all of the state’s electoral votes. This makes it extremely difficult for a third party to win, i. e. the two-party system is reinforced. In many cases the Electoral College system has failed so far as keeping elections fair. Two instances in particular reveal the inadequacy of the Electoral College procedure. An example of a popular third party candidate that was denied any serious validation as a Presidential candidate would be Ross Perot in the 1992 election. Perot garnered almost 20 percent of the popular vote across the country but did not receive a single electoral vote due to the Electoral College rules. This discrepancy between electoral and popular votes has led to many wanting to put an end to the Electoral College system and replace it with popular voting. Another example of the failure of the Electoral College system was exemplified in the 2000 election, when Al Gore was not chosen to be president although he had the popular vote of the country. A systematic conspiracy to heavily manipulate the vote in the critical state of Florida to favor Bush in the 2000 Bush-Gore presidential election ultimately resulted in a Bush victory. The blatant manipulation methods used were enough to swing the election to Bush and away from Gore. The evident fraud in the voting process and the failure of the courts to intervene in a proper and non-partisan manner cost Gore the Presidency. When it became apparent on November 8, 2000 that neither Gore nor Bush had the majority of the electoral votes required to win the Presidency, the state of Florida became the focus of attention. Both candidates needed a majority in Florida to win the White House, but voting irregularities prevented the final tally from being reached for over five weeks. What voters didn’t realize was that the voting procedure wasn’t the only problem in Florida, but that the process to insure George W. Bush’s victory had been in place for over two years before the election. Florida Governor Jeb Bush, George W. Bush’s brother, was elected in 1998. He immediately put a plan into action that would help his brother gain the Florida electoral votes in the 2000 election. Gov. Bush let special interest groups know that they expected political donations of $2 for every $1 donated to Democrats or defaulters would lose access to the governor and the legislative leadership, and their businesses would tank. The Governor also began replacing   Ã‚   Democrats throughout Florida state government, his first purge of Democratic voters. Governor Jeb Bush’s next step to eliminate Democratic power in Florida was to appoint staunch Republicans to control Florida’s educational system, including state senator Jim Horne as Florida’s first Secretary of Education and most of the individual university presidents. He accomplished this feat by eliminating the Florida Board of Regents. The board was replaced by separate boards of trustees at all ten of the state universities According to Lance deHaven-Smith, in his book entitled The Battle for Florida, â€Å"the governor was given the power to make all the trustee appointments†. This created an enormous source of new patronage and also undermined the political neutrality of the state universities. With the Board of Regents out of the way, Republicans quickly replaced many of the university presidents with political insiders. (deHaven-Smith, 2005) The Florida Republican Party then began a drive to disenfranchise Democratic voters. They paid a private company to purge the voter registry of all ex-felons, even though Florida courts twice ruled that ex-felons whose civil rights had been restored before they came to Florida were entitled to vote. This would benefit the Republicans because blacks made up more than 50% of the ex-felon list and 9 0% of the black Florida population voted Democratic. In 1999, newly-elected Secretary of State Katherine Harris paid Data Base Technologies (DBT) $4. million to compile the most extensive scrub list possible. Race was a big factor in compiling matches for the list. After the election, DBT testified before a congressional committee that Florida officials had ordered them to eliminate voters by making incorrect matches. The information was gathered from the Internet and no verifying telephone calls were made. Five months before the election, Harris (who coincidentally was co-chairing the Bush presidential campaign) sent the list of 57,700 names to all the precincts with instructions to remove those voters from the rolls. Greg Palast revealed the story of the scrub list in The Observer, London, November 26, 2000. The story was ignored by American mainstream press. Palast has since provided irrefutable, hard evidence of fraud. His most recent estimate of qualified Florida voters barred from casting a ballot in Election 2000 stands at 90,000. On January 10, 2001, NAACP lawyers sued and won their case against DBT, Secretary of State Katherine Harris, and Bush loyalist Clay Roberts, Director of the Division of Elections. (Palast, 2003)   On Election Day 2000 in the state of Florida, however; Republican voters stood in short ines and used up-to-date equipment. The machinations of the Republican Party paid off in black districts. Highway patrol officers flagged down voters at roadblocks and checked their drivers’ licenses while others waited in long lines to vote on ancient machines. Innocent citizens were turned away and informed that their names appeared on the ex-felons list when they showed up to vote. Republicans found other ways to disenfranchise opposition voters. Two-page ballots with misleading directions were printed in Austin, Texas (the center of the George W. Bush presidential campaign), returned to Florida, and distributed in black districts. Some votes were simply later trashed by ballot handlers. In Duval County, 27,000 ballots were discarded, over half of them from black precincts in Jacksonville. No official challenges were filed within the 72-hour time limit, so thousands of mostly Democratic votes were lost. Sixteen-thousand votes for Gore disappeared overnight from the ongoing Volusia County tally and were reinstated only when an election supervisor questioned the subtraction of already registered votes. No voting machine company representative or election official was able to explain what happened. (Dover, 2002) Around 8 p. m. on Election Day exit polls from Voter News Service projected a Gore victory, but Bev Harris uncovered an CBS news report revealing that the erroneous subtraction of Gore’s votes in Volusia caused the election to be called for Bush. For several hours the race was too close to call, but shortly after midnight, Bush’s numbers plunged rapidly and Gore gained the lead. Despite Gore’s numbers, at 2:16 a. m. Fox News announced that Texas Governor George W. Bush had won Florida and the other television networks repeated Fox’s false information. (Harris, 2004) Gore heard the fake news of his defeat, phoned his congratulations to Bush and was prepared to deliver his concession speech to the nation. At that point, Gore’s chief advisors in Florida told him it was much too early to concede formally and advised him to hold off since there were still 360,000 uncounted votes. Out of 6 million votes cast in Florida, Bush’s lead was reported to be a mere 537 votes. The Florida Constitution had no provisions for a statewide recount, so Gore asked for a partial recount in four southern counties where glaring irregularities had shown up. The last thing the Bush team wanted was a fair recount. They complained to the press that Gore was a sore loser, and the press largely agreed. (Posner, 2001)   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  On December 8, the Florida Supreme Court overturned a circuit court decision and ordered a manual recount. Based on findings in the circuit court trial, Gore was awarded 393 votes, reducing Bush’s lead to only 154 votes. That’s when the Bush camp went ballistic. (Simon, 2001)   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  The National Party sent out-of-state operatives to intimidate Republican county clerks to amend over votes in Republican counties, to amend incomplete absentee ballot applications, and to accept late-arriving military ballots lacking signatures. When the recount actually began they became more radical, charged into the county administration building, threatening county canvassers, and halted the recount of Miami-Dade ballots. Despite court orders, eighteen counties never attempted a recount. The Bush campaign team and lawyers circulated misinformation about Florida’s election laws, about the reliability of manual recounts (both Jeb and George W. claimed that only machines could count accurately), and about the likelihood of a constitutional crisis. (Zelden, 2010) The Florida Constitution specifies that the intent of the voter be paramount during ballot recounting. Because electronic machines had repeatedly failed to read, discern intent, and count ballots accurately, manual recounting was mandated. The law was actually quite clear and no constitutional crisis was imminent. That did not stop the Bush team from pressing the issue, for they wanted the U. S. Supreme Court to intervene and prevent the recount. Republican leadership called the legislature into special session while the judiciary branch still addressed election issues, an extraordinary move. Speaker of the House Tom Feeney, Jeb’s bosom political buddy, took the podium and criticized the Florida Supreme Court decisions. He warned that if the dispute continued to December 12, Florida’s electoral slate would be excluded from the Electoral College vote. Florida had submitted its election results as they were certified, so the electoral slate was never really in danger. The Bush legal team, determined to delay or stop the recount, appealed to the U. S. District Court of Appeals, the Florida Supreme Court, and the U. S. Supreme Court. The justices had no business interfering in the election. The U. S. Constitution authorizes Congress to settle election disputes, not the Supreme Court. The first two courts denied the appeal. Then the U. S. Supreme Court gave them the nod. From that moment, the fix was in. Zelden, 2010) Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas had close relatives working for Republican organizations and should have recused themselves. Antonin Scalia’s son Eugene is a Washington law partner of Theodore B. Olson, the attorney who twice argued before the Supreme Court on behalf of George W. Bush. Scalia’s son John is an attorney with the Miami law firm that represented Bush in Florida. Clarence Thomas†™s wife, Virginia, worked for the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank, and had been helping to collect applications from people seeking employment in the Bush administration. But they, along with the three other right-wing judges on the court, issued a ruling instructing the Florida courts to find a recount method that would apply â€Å"equal standards. † The decision came down at 10 p. m. on December 12, 2000, two hours before the deadline to submit voting results. In short, the U. S. Supreme Court ran the clock out on American voters and handed Florida’s electoral votes and the presidency to George W. Bush. (Thoreau, 2007) Reviewing the actual results of the statewide examination of 175,010 disputed ballots, on November 12, 2001 Robert Parry, www. consortiumnews. om, cleared away the media fog: â€Å"So Al Gore was the choice of Florida’s voters — whether one counts hanging chads or dimpled chads. That was the core finding of the eight news organizations that conducted a review of disputed Florida ballots. By any chad measure, Gore won. Gore won even if one doesn’t count the 15,000-25,000 votes that USA Today estimate d Gore lost because of illegally designed ‘butterfly ballots,’ or the hundreds of predominantly African-American voters who were falsely identified by the state as felons and turned away from the polls. Gore won even if there’s no adjustment for George W. Bush’s windfall of about 290 votes from improperly counted military absentee ballots where lax standards were applied to Republican counties and strict standards to Democratic ones, a violation of fairness reported earlier by the Washington Post and the New York Times. Put differently, George W. Bush was not the choice of Florida’s voters anymore than he was the choice of the American people who cast a half million more ballots for Gore than Bush nationwide. † Although the 2000 election was a travesty, one positive outcome was the renewal in the nation’s interest in The National Popular Vote bill.